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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to explain how an intergovernmental process among four countries to “harmonize” the 
“architecture” of their higher education systems in under ten years turned into an “OMC-type” process with 
a full role for the European Commission and a membership of forty-six countries, a system which appears 
to have had some substantial results. The paper argues that the speed of the process is accounted for by a 
“coordination imperative,” and that the sustainability (institutionalization) of the process has been a product 
of the initiatives for goals, instruments, support structures, and measurements generated by an “entre–
preneurial alliance” composed of the Commission and the European Universities Association as “drivers” 
of the process and as solver of a collective action problem among social actors interested in university re-
form, in the context of a permissive consensus of the member states 
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  Within less than a decade one state’s initiative to agree with three European 
counterparts upon joint principles to govern the reform of their individual university 
systems, a “common architecture,” has become a highly elaborated OMC-type “process” 
with not only an extended number of goals, but also agreed instruments and measure-
ments, and with forty-six European countries adhering! Although initiated as strictly 
intergovernmental, and outside the European Union, within three years the EU’s Com-
mission had been recognized as a “member” (i.e., not observer) of the process. 
 
The professed aim of the effort was a “European Higher Education Area,” where 
students and researchers could have their work recognized and therefore have access to 
the whole of Europe’s higher education resources – by 2010. (Behind the initiative of the 
first few continental countries had been the wish to obtain legitimacy and allies for the 
internal reform of their own university systems, deemed ineffective and costly, as well 
as highly recalcitrant to change.) Recent reports assess that there is substantial imple-
mentation, even if it is highly uneven both within and between countries. 
 
   The major question of the paper is: how could such a weak process lead astonish-
ingly fast to hard policy changes within states? In the language of this paper, what 
“modes of governance” were used? Two subsidiary issues are: what accounts for the ra-
pidity with which this initiative spread, and how was it sustained and institutionalized? 
How did the European Commission become an integral, if not leading, part of the pro-
cess? Does this case tell us anything about the conditions under which such governance 
is likely to be created and sustained? 
 
      My argument is that the Bologna process, a predominantly cooperative mode of 
governance (a necessity since it was voluntary), began as a strictly intergovernmental 
process but that this fast proved ineffective, creating an implicit “demand” for leader-
ship. The Commission, which especially in the education area had had long experience 
with the constraints of the EU Treaty, worked together with the association representing 
European universities in crafting a catalytic and coordinative role (the policy and leader-
ship “supply”) – even though this process was not and is not formally an EU enterprise. 
Especially because of the “softness” of the governance process, a “driver” was necessary. 
Put another way, once the Commission/universities-association team became an institu-
tionalized player, the whole “seemingly intergovernmental” process became sustainable 
(institutionalized). I account for the rapidity with which the number of member-states 
increased by what I call the “coordination imperative.”  
 
I. The surprisingly rapid spread of the European Higher Education Area 
 
  In 1998, the French Minister of Higher Education, Claude Allegre, using the occa-
sion of the 800th anniversary of the founding of the Sorbonne, invited his counterparts in 
Germany, Italy and, as an afterthought, England to agree to a “Joint declaration on the 
harmonization of the architecture of the European higher education system.” 
  
The story has been recounted by several authors (Corbett 2005, Ravinet 2005, de 
Wit 2003, Naeve 2003, Keeling 2006). In 1999, at Bologna, the Ministers of twenty-nine 
countries signed the “Bologna Declaration,” calling for the creation of a European 
Higher Education Area by 2010. The twenty-nine were members of the EU, the then ac-
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cession states, and the three members of the European Economic Area. They established 
a process of biannual Ministerial meetings, with rotating venue, Chair, and Secretariat. 
These were prepared for by information circulation, meetings and workshops to com-
pare information about their higher education systems. Six operational objectives or 
“action lines” were specified: 1.) Adoption of a system of easily readable and compar-
able degrees, 2.) Adoption of a system essentially based on two cycles, 3.) Establishment 
of a system of credits, 4.) Promotion of academic mobility, 5.) Promotion of European co-
operation in quality assurance, 6.) Promotion of a European dimension in higher edu-
cation. 
 
 In the ensuing eight years the policy areas increased to ten, namely by adding: 
7.) Lifelong learning, 8.) Involvement of higher education institutions and students as 
“active partners, 9.) Enhancement of the “attractiveness” of EHEA, and 10.) Doctoral 
studies as a third cycle and synergy between EHEA and  ERA, the European Research 
Area. The Bologna strategy was melded with the larger (EU) Lisbon Strategy, and the 
number of participant states increased radically, to forty-six. 
 
  Institutionally, non-state and expert actors were made Observers, the key one be-
ing the European Universities Association (EUA). Others were its vocational education 
counterpart, EURASHE, and the National Unions of Students in Europe, ESIB, as well as in-
ternational organizations long active in gathering information and offering policy pre-
scriptions on education, the Council of Europe and the OECD. A crucial part of the pro-
cess, the Bologna Follow-Up Group, BFUG, (the between-ministerial-meetings group and 
its steering committee) was institutionalized in 2001. At the same time, the European 
Commission was formally included as a member (i.e., not just an observer), both in 
Ministerial meetings and in BFUG. By 2003 the European Network for Quality Assurance 
(ENQA) was a participant, as well as (only) one of the European level social partners, 
UNICE (the European Employers Federation). They and Education International (EI), a 
(worldwide) organization of academic trade unions (from pre-school to university) were 
brought in as “consultative members” of BFUG. This elaborate consultative and policy 
promoting process revolves around the biannual meetings of Education Ministers.1 
 
The reform which has been emblematic for Bologna is the three-year first de-
gree plus two-year second degree (now complemented with a “notionally” three-four 
year third degree), all together three “cycles.” Note that this allows for a student to at-
tend another university, even one in another country, for the second (or third) degrees. 
This replaces the continental template of a five-year first degree (from which there 
were many drop-outs, and under which those who completed it tended to do so in 
seven to eight years). The recent (2005, 2007) stocktaking studies concluded that the 
change had been adopted by “almost all signatory countries” in “almost all fields” 
                                                 
1“The European Higher Educatiion Area-Achieving the Goals,” Communique of the Conference 
of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen, pp. 19-20 (May 2005), p. 1 (Ber-
gen Communiqué). See latest official Bologna website http://www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/, 
which has a link to historical material put together on the Bergen website and lists BFUG meetings 
and  BFUG–sponsored “seminars” which are structured to end in recommendations to the next 
Ministerial meeting. 
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(medicine excepted) and that there were fewer “structural barriers between cycles.” A 
credit system, ECTS, is in use in most countries and “most commonly” used both for 
credit transfer and credit accumulation. “Over half” the countries will provide a Di-
ploma Supplement for all institutions and study programs. This document serves 
some of the purposes of a North American transcript, which had had no European 
equivalent. These comprise the original “mobility Bologna.” More demanding but for 
the same overarching purpose is the call for a “National Qualifications Framework,” 
“certified against the overarching Framework for Qualifications of the EHEA.” The 
communiqué after the most recent (London) Ministerial meeting says “around ten 
countries” have committed themselves to this. Related is the Lisbon Recognition Con-
vention (ratified by thirty-six of the forty-five Bologna countries by 2005) which shifts 
the burden of proof in any denial of recognition of qualifications to the institution 
denying them. 
 
Reform within a university program was the introduction of “research train-
ing” (i.e., taught courses, in addition to the research requirement), for the Ph.D. “Vir-
tually all” signatory countries either recommended or required this. And persistent 
pressure, presumably for effectiveness and efficiency (in teaching, in administration), 
is to be exerted through the institutionalization of “Quality Assurance” Agencies, in-
dependent of the educational authorities. The report said that “most” countries had 
this, (although nine of the forty-five had agencies that were not independent of the 
authorities). In 2005 European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the 
EHEA (ESG) were adopted, and there has been pressure for a European “Register” of 
QA agencies, with the aim of allowing universities to choose among them. Progress on 
some of the more recently adopted objectives, like “lifelong learning” (now also a for-
mal EU mandate to the Commission), cannot yet be assessed but look, in some Com-
mission formulations, to subsume higher education, including universities (Reichert 
and Tauch 2005, Crozier 2007).2  
 
Even if one qualifies the findings of the recent reports,3 and even if we under-
stand that there are (and are bound to be), disparities in implementation and/or per-
formance among institutions within states, still, by any measure, the movement within 
nine years has been remarkable. 
 
II. An Explanation of the Pace: the Coordination Imperative 
 
  I am struck by the coordination aspect (Hardin 1995, Schelling 1971, Krasner 
1991) of the early Bologna Process. Here, I believe, the fact that the “big four” countries 
agreed on something acted as a “critical mass” (to mix metaphors). The agreement of 
the four largest and most influential states gave strong incentives for others to join. 
Why? The only potential sanction was being “out” when many and/or important oth-
                                                 
2For academic analyses at the halfway point, see: “The Bologna Process: a mid-term review” and 
“Le processus de Bologne à mi-parcours” in bibliography. 
3The comparative reports on implementation are significant but difficult to interpret. The 2005 Fo-
cus on the Structure of Higher Education in Europe 2004/05. National Trends in the Bologna Process, 
warned that it was reporting data “on the intentions of policy-makers” (p. 5). The 2007 Focus used 
general quantitative terms such as “most.” 
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ers are “in,” that is, having your students’ education not “recognized” in what was to 
be a process importantly aimed at recognition by each other and by outsiders, recog-
nition not only of individual students but of your universities, your “attractiveness” as 
an educational and scientific center. Being “out” would stymie your students’ and fac-
ulty members’ mobility in the new context, one in which, unlike the past, others would 
be mobile. Thus one significant incentive to join the dominant group, once it seems to 
have a good chance of being dominant, is not to be left out and, therefore, left behind. 
The prospect of competition under the new conditions created incentives to cooperate 
(in this case, to join).  
 
The “two cycle,” “three-plus-two” pattern provided a focal point for the states 
(Garrett and Weingast 1991). At the time, different models were being thought about by 
the Ministers in France and Germany. Now the discussion was crystallized around a 
three-year “bachelors” and two-year “masters.”4 The “focal point” idea helps us under-
stand the looseness with which the “three-plus-two” idea has been interpreted: first 
cycle, three-four years; second cycle, one-two years, but the two cycles together should 
not be more than five years. This permits the British three-year first degree or four-year 
(first) Honours degree plus a one-year Masters (Becker 2004). In this whole process, 
without overt sanctions, and with a desire to allow for national educational traditions, 
leeway is important and the question is the tolerability of the leeway for the objective of 
mutual recognition, within a roughly similar pattern. 
 
  The context of enlargement also makes the coordination argument plausible. 
Accession countries were eager to join “European” and “Western” arrangements. They 
wanted to be involved in all networks. Academically they wanted and needed recogni-
tion for their educational systems in the aftermath of ideological inheritances, and 
needed technical assistance to catch up. Some countries had great ancient universities 
with long and illustrious traditions, and they wanted recognition for that. 
 
      Of course coordination is only one dimension of this process. Countries could 
hardly be indifferent to the characteristics of the system with which they were to “co-
ordinate” and for which they would be obliged to make (technically or politically) ex-
pensive changes. This does not, however, vitiate the point that there was in addition a 
coordination aspect – and in this case, it seems to have outweighed reservations about 
substance astonishingly quickly. An “education-specialist-diplomat-entrepreneur,” 
when asked how the smaller countries were brought along in the year between Sor-
bonne (four countries) and Bologna (twenty-nine countries), said that the argument 
was: “It’s going to happen”5 which, I would maintain, is exactly the argument likely to 
elicit the “if so, we had better be in” response, what I call the perceived “coordination 
imperative.” 
 
                                                 
4Ravinet (2005) argues that “coagulation” around the “three-plus-two”  idea at the Sorbonne 
meeting, given its stability in later years, is like the famous QWERTY keyboard See David 1985. I 
would add that the QWERTY analogy warns that an early decision may or may not be best (most 
efficient). Bologna, for example, has run into problems with having graduates of three-year 
degrees accepted in many U.S. institutions. 
5Interview, Dr. Guy Haug, Brussels, November 29, 2005 (hereafter, Haug interview). 
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III. The Incentives for States and Universities to Cooperate 
 
   For states, the consequences of the status quo had become very visible in an era 
of increased student mobility and worldwide scientific/economic competition. In many 
European countries (the templates are Germany and Italy), mass education had been 
superimposed on university structures which had changed little from the time of very 
small elite cohorts. This was not only straining resources, but was both cost-inefficient 
and cost-ineffective. Graduates were not clearly employable. In general, universities 
were extremely underfunded. The number of students going from Europe to North 
America and from Asia to North America far outnumbered those coming to Europe for 
higher education. When a Shanghai ranking of universities put European universities 
far down the scale, Europeans were shocked! 
 
   The exception was Britain, which attracted international students, for both aca-
demic and language reasons, and charged substantial foreign fees; higher education was 
one of Britain's “export industries.” Others aspired to attract foreign students for scien-
tific and industrial/economic, as well as for cultural, reasons. 
 
Second, the role of knowledge in the economy focused attention upon research 
generation as a weapon in the “economic competitiveness” battle. Comparative informa-
tion showed that national levels of funding for research in the U.S., Canada and Japan 
were far higher than those in (most of) Europe. In the U.S., a much greater proportion of 
the funding came from private, mostly industry, sources, and also from tuition. Con-
nected with this, and with underfunded universities, was clearly the issue of attracting 
the best researchers and advanced students.  
 
   The European Union’s Lisbon Agenda (2000), for example, had emphasized the 
role of knowledge in its diagnosis of the lagging economies of Europe. In its OECD/Lis-
bon supply-side diagnosis, the economic problems were seen as “structural,” exacer-
bated, but not caused, by radically intensified global trade and investment competition. 
The new requirements were economic “restructuring” and increased “flexibility.” The 
universal nostrums were: “education and training,” investing in “human capital,” 
“upskilling,” “lifelong learning” for “employability.” Science was seen as part and 
parcel of “innovation”; close ties between research and industry were to be promoted. 
Knowledge creation had become part of economic potential. 
 
In this context Huisman and van der Wendt’s observation that “the presumed 
lack of national governments’ acceptance of international or supranational interference 
in higher education is not as deep as expected” is less surprising than it might be (Huis-
man and van der Wende 2004). 
 
What were the incentives for universities? The Bologna process was, in impor-
tant ways, a “bottom-up” process, although it seems impossible that anything like this 
could have taken off without the “top-down” agreement of the states. In what sense, if 
any, did it emerge from the universities? 
 
First of all, symbolically, the Sorbonne Declaration of 1998 was preceded by a dec-
ade by the “Magna Carta” of 1988, a statement by the Rectors of European universities. 
It stressed first the autonomy of the universities and the inseparability of research and 
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teaching. It called for encouragement of mobility of teachers and students, and policies 
of “equivalence” for diplomas. These important desiderata were picked up and opera-
tionalized a decade later at Bologna (1999). More significantly these Rectors and Uni-
versities in 2001 formed, out of two prior organizations, the EUA, the European Univer-
sities Association. It now claims to represent more than 750 universities. High up on its 
agenda was influencing the Bologna Process “through collective action,” and including 
the universities in the policy discussions on the ERA, the European Research Area. (EUA 
2001-2005).  In fact, EUA  has met and produced declarations before each Ministerial 
meeting after Bologna; it sits on BFUG, the important follow-up group, and participates 
in the drafting of the Ministerial Communiques; it publishes “responses” to Commis-
sion statements. 
 
The Commission has contracted with EUA to produce, prior to each Ministerial 
meeting, the major biannual comparative descriptive report (published under the in-
nocuous series title “Trends...”). The Commission and others make use of these in pol-
icy documents. One of the EUA’s principal specialists, long active in EUA (and before 
that in other, including American, higher educational organizations), someone who has 
been involved in all the Bologna meetings, has at other times been on contract to the 
Commission.6 Together with the striking policy consonance of the two organizations, this 
suggests a rather blurred line between the Commission and the universities organiza-
tion, and more generally, in a pattern familiar to students of the EU, a rather blurred 
line between the Commission and expert groups, the establishment of several of which it 
has encouraged or which it helps sustain. 
 
More broadly, one could fairly say that many of the key elements of Bologna – 
not necessarily the “three-plus-two” (plus three) model per se, but having several lev-
els of university education with “bridges” between them; not necessarily ECTS and the 
DS, but some form of crediting system for work done elsewhere; not necessarily the spe-
cific form of Quality Assessment (QA) being evolved, but some form of independent as-
sessment, and accountability based upon “learning outcomes” (rather than just “in-
puts”); some way of integrating nontraditional learning and vocational learning so that 
employers, universities, and foreign universities could “read” and “recognize” (or at 
least, evaluate) them–all these would be part of the accepted aims of specialists in 
education at every level. The educational “epistemic community”7 provided much of 
the mutually accepted information, as well as a similar diagnosis, and generally similar 
prescriptions. (Note that these diagnoses and prescriptions were aimed at and justified 
as what is effective and efficient for the individual student.) 
 
The educational objectives of those international organizations which have long 
produced cross-national research on education – OECD, UNESCO, and the Council of Eur-
ope – are largely the same. They have been part of the creators of the epistemic under-
standing, and part of the “pre-history” of Bologna; they have been “reinforcing” re-
gimes, contributing data, ideas and framing. They have participated in Bologna as “ob-
                                                 
6Dr. Guy Haug. In 2005 the Commission itself had only a few people in its unit on Schools and 
Higher Education within DG Education and Culture, and only one other, as far as I could find 
out, who followed the Bologna process. 
7On the concept of “epistemic community,” see Haas 1992. 
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servers” from the start. (The last two sponsored the 1997 Lisbon Recognition Conven-
tion (2000) which, much as “mutual recognition” had done for the single market within 
the EU, reversed the burden of proof in the recognition of academic credentials.) Michel 
Crochet, Rector of The University of Louvain, argues that academics, especially the 
Rectors, were “the motor” of change (Crochet 2004). Claude Allegre, the French Edu-
cation Minister, was a scientist; Crochet, an engineer; scientists and engineers were par-
ticularly attuned to worldwide standards of excellence, to the consequences of low 
funding, to ties to the economy, to issues of the job market. Luigi Berlinguer, the Italian 
Minister of Higher Education in 1998, was a jurist, not a scientist (in the North American 
sense of the word), but had been the President of the Rectors’ Conference in Italy. To 
adduce quite different evidence, when, in 2005, a Vice Rector at the Université Libre de 
Bruxelles was asked about the “reception” of Bologna changes in the university, he vol-
unteered that it was “good for the managers.”8 I would argue that what we see here is 
an “entrepreneurial” alliance between EUA, representing university administrations, 
and the Commission. This created drive (“leadership”) as well as developed the policy 
and information which aided largely willing States’ administrations. These State Minis-
tries then, in de facto alliance with some Rector teams, instituted changes in the univer-
sities. It has been commented perceptively that what has resulted is a form of differen-
tiated integation, but this time not a core-periphery model.9 Several of the “old” and 
“founding” states (Germany, Italy, France) “went to Europe” to get allies or legitima-
tion for change; they were not the sources of models for diffusion to others. They were 
the source of “Demand” and the Commission-EUA t h e  s o u r c e  o f  ( p o l i c y )  “ S u p p l y . ”  
Other countries responded largely to the “coordination imperative.” 
 
One of the striking things about the Bologna process is that, since the turn of the 
twenty-first century, the universities are organized in a Europe-wide body; so are the 
student unions; international organizations are present. Only university faculty qua 
professors/faculty members are unrepresented as so-called “stakeholders.” Why? Is it 
because they are organized only by discipline or, in some countries, by trade unions? 
The sole organization in some fashion representing faculty members, and accorded Ob-
server status at Bergen in 2005, was Education International, which is an organization of 
trade unions of teachers from pre-school to university, and from 160 countries, i.e., not 
limited to Europe. (It was they who commissioned the sole work I found on the reactions 
of faculty members, a survey called “The Role of Academics in the Bologna Process.”10) 
                                                 
8Interview, Brussels, November 28, 2005. I take “manager” to be “administrator.” See also Mus-
selin (2004) for a description of 1998 changes in “steering” in French universities. The Dutch uni-
versity model has appointed deans, and an attempt was made by key Flemish Rectors at Leuven 
and Ghent in Belgium to institute this model. (Interview, Mr. Noel Vercrysse, Ministry of Educa-
tion, Flemish Community, November 29, 2005) 
9Katharina Holzinger at the Conference on “Governance and Policy-Making in the European 
Union,” University of Osnabruck, November 2-4, 2006.  
10EI says that it represents 348 organizations in 166 countries (141 in forty-one European coun-
tries), organizations “of teachers and education and research employees upholding the principle 
of independent Trade Unionism.” See their website: http://www.ei-ie.org/en/aboutus/ – “The 
Role of Academics in the Bologna Process” (Working Paper #15, February 2005) surveys, among 
other things, changes in working conditions, degrees of implementation, participation of the 
member organization at the national government level, etc. (Tables 8, 7, 2, 16). Majorities agreed 
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There appears to be no European-level professorial organization. Huisman and van der 
Wendt (2004, p. 354) argue that the level of support for change by both academics and 
students is key to the variation in implementation. They also expect greater turmoil as 
quality assurance issues, brain drain, minority language protection, and GATS come to 
the fore. My main point is that the category of actors that might be expected to have 
had opinions about, qualifications as to, or reservations about, changes to university 
“governance,” to external judgments of “quality,” to conditions of funding, etc. – that 
group was hors du combat! 11 
  
IV. If the initiative for the Sorbonne/Bologna Process was in form and authority 
strictly intergovernmental, how did the Commission acquire a substantial role in the 
process? 
 
  There are three elements to an answer: (1) the clumsiness of a strictly intergov-
ernmental process (generating implicit demand); (2) the Commission’s honed tech-
niques of influence, developed under the constraints of a Treaty in which, in the area of 
education, it had a very small and delimited role (supply); (3) a new political context.  
 
(1) Clumsy Intergovernmentalism? 
 
  By the first ministerial meeting after Bologna the Commission was made a regu-
lar participant (not an Observer). Why? Anne Corbett thought that by Prague (2001), 
the process was “stuck” for want of “policy development” and that they “brought in the 
Commission and EUA.”12 The point is that the intergovernmental process by itself was 
probably “clumsy,” i.e., ineffective or inefficient or both, giving incentives to the Member 
States or the Presidency to look to the Commission. This is supposition. But it does im-
ply that the states were generally speaking “in cahoots” with the entrepreneurial team. 
         
(2) Continuity of Techniques Developed within Delimited Treaty Scope 
 
  The Treaty of Rome leaves the central area of education to the member states. 
(What would later be called “subsidiarity” would seem to reinforce this.) How then did 
the Commission become so deeply involved in it? They did have some Treaty author-
ity. “Vocational education and training” had been put within the Commission's author-
ized scope by virtue of its connection to the economic market. The Commission had had 
                                                                                                                                                 
or partly agreed with the statements: “The Bologna Process (BP) is a necessary push for national 
reform” (53 percent); “The outcomes of the BP are making it easier for our universities/colleges 
to interact with other European higher education systems” (84 percent); “The BP addresses im-
portant questions for our national higher educational institutions” (87 percent); but also “The BP 
contributes to standardizing our higher education system in a way that is alien to our national 
traditions” (68 percent), and “The BP represents a marketization of our national higher education 
system” (51 percent). 
11Interesting unintended testimony to this lack is an article by Ian Bache, a student of the EU 
(Bache, 2006). Bache takes issue with an EU-funded network in European studies (not at all part 
of the Bologna process). What is interesting for our purposes, however, is that he raises the ques-
tion of whether there were or are significant and appropriate channels through which academics, worried 
about the disciplinary or more broadly intellectual consequences of any part of the process, can be heard at 
the European level. 
12Interview, London, November 6, 2005.  
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some help as well from the European Court of Justice which in 1985 had defined “voca-
tional education” so broadly that almost all university education would be considered 
“vocational” (Corbett 2005, pp. 123-25). The Commission was also given some Treaty au-
thority over Research (TEU Article 189). In hindsight we can see that the sentence in the 
Maastricht Treaty saying that the Commission could/should “encourage” quality in 
Higher Education, although neither exclusive nor shared jurisdiction, could be used as 
authority to be a “chivvier”; it is permission to herd cats. The Commission considered 
that it gave them “Treaty based” authority in this field at last.13  
 
  Anne Corbett’s 2005 insightful monograph, Universities and the Europe of Knowl-
edge, traces the Commission's efforts over nearly forty years to find a strategy in the 
educational sector. A key point, in 1976 was an institutional innovation, when an “Edu-
cation Committee” was established in which the European Commission participated as 
a member in what otherwise looked like a comitology group (before there were such), 
that is, a gathering of national civil servants under the European Council (Corbett 2005, 
Chapter 7; European Commission 2006, pp. 88-89). Today we see parallels in several 
such arrangements in “open method of coordination” areas and similar processes like 
Bologna.  
 
  The kinds of techniques which the Commission developed, given the Treaty con-
straints, are relatively well known and I shall just note them here. In addition to behind- 
the-scenes diplomatic activity, the first and crucial technique is direct and indirect capa-
city creation (interestingly enough, very close to the techniques used in the accession 
process, where I think they first came to very public notice). DG Education and Culture 
and its Schools and Higher Education Unit have used funding directly to create and 
support organizations (for example, Eurydice, the information network on education in 
Europe (Brussels), or the European Journal of Education (Paris); these, over time, cre-
ated the information, statistics and comparative analysis, academic knowledge and pol-
icy discussion on which both the States and the Commission then drew.  
 
   Some of the institutions that the Commission created exemplify what Suzanne 
Schmidt calls “support structures” needed because, she says, “mutual recognition” 
(which, grosso modo, is what Bologna aims at) shifts transaction costs from decision 
making to the implementation stage.14 Thus the important ENIC/NARIC centers (informa-
tion centers and credential evaluators), and ENQA, the European Network of Quality As-
surance Agencies, for example, are intended to establish the “trust” among universities 
which will allow them to recognize, credit and accept students and scholars from other 
institutions, especially from other Bologna countries. 
 
   Indirectly, the Commission contracts out, a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  
“Trends” series. Trends IV: European Universities Implementing Bologna, published by EUA, 
provided, for example: 1) implementation information for BFUG (the influential Bologna 
Follow-Up Committee which guides the process between the biannual ministerial meet-
ings), and 2) descriptive analysis for more general availability especially for Ministries (or 
their critics) to make comparisons to “peers.” 
                                                 
13Haug interview. The Treaty source is Chapter 3, Art. 126 (Keeliing 2006, footnote 5). 
14Susanne K.Schmidt at Osnabruck conference above, November 2-4, 2006. 
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  Secondly, the Commission has also sought out interlocutors, “stakeholder” 
groups like ESIB, the organization representing national unions of students in Europe or, 
as we have seen, the EUA itself. It looks sometimes as if they have had a hand in, if not 
taken the initiative for, creating them. For example, in 2000 (the year of the Lisbon Agen-
da) three European student organizations, ESIB, AEGEE (Association des Etats Généraux 
des Etudiants de l’Europe) and “the Erasmus student network” were constituted as 
what was called a “European liaison group”; this group then participated in the Euro-
pean Commission-organized consultative meeting on Socrates and higher education, 
together with representatives of universities and other higher education institutions. 
Later ESIB alone won recognition as the representative of students (Klemencic 2007). In a 
second example, after the Lisbonization of Bologna, the Commission has also worked 
with (called in?) non-educational but interested “stakeholders” like ERT, the highly in-
fluential European Round Table (of some of the largest and most successful transnation-
al firms), with whom other parts of the Commission had worked on other issues.15  
  
   Thirdly, the Commission may use its formal position within the EU legislative 
process to formulate and propose Recommendations to the Council and Parliament. If 
the Commission’s Recommendation becomes that of the EU’s Parliament and Council, 
then the substance of the Recommendation can be brought to the next Bologna Ministerial 
meeting with considerable expectation of passing; if passed there it will represent agree-
ment by the forty-six.16 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the role of the Commission in framing 
educational issues is now well documented (see the next section.) It may reconceive the 
use of standard EU resources, for example, currently proposing that the states reorient 
the EU Structural Funds toward improving states’ support for research and human 
capital, (thus framing education and research issues as an ingredient in economic 
growth).17 Related to this the Commission often seeks to give technical issues a public 
face. For example it proposed an ECTS “label” for the diplomas of universities which 
have instituted ECTS throughout all their programs, or a Diploma Supplement “label” 
for universities which provide a DS with all diplomas, automatically, without cost, and 
in a major European language.  
 
How does the Commission itself see its role? In December 1999 (just as the Bo-
logna process was getting underway), Guy Haug argued that most ministers and uni-
versities were aware of internal issues, but not, for example, of the growth of transna-
tional education, of the challenges of privatization, of the “decreasing attractiveness” of 
European higher education to the rest of the world.18 To increase this awareness was 
what he and the Commission-EUA collaboration had set out to do. Consciousness-
                                                 
15Even before Bologna, CRE (the Association of European Universities, one of the predecessors of 
EUA), in a joint project with the European Commission and the European Roundtable of Indus-
trialists, called upon universities to have “meaningful dialogue with their stakeholders (Davies).” 
For CERT-Commission relations in the crucial case of the Single European Act, see Cowles,1995.  
16“From Berlin to Bergen,” p. 3. 
17Haug interview. 
18Guy Haug , Keynote speech ”Visions of a European Future: Bologna and Beyond,” 11th EAIE 
Conference, Maastricht, December 2,1999, p. 2. 
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raising is also a Commission (in this case, a joint) role. In a 2006 Communication called 
“Delivering on the Modernisation Agenda for Universities: Education, Research, and In-
novation,” the Commission, after diagnosing the “challenges” to European universities 
and the “changes required,” included a page headed “…and what the Commission can 
and should do”: 
 
The Commission is not a direct actor in the modernisation of universities, 
but it can play a catalytic role, providing political impetus and targeted 
funding in support of reform and modernization. (European Commis-
sion, COM 2006, 208 final, p. 1)  
 
This is a good summary of the examples I've just given. However, it gives no idea 
of the ingenuity and persistent entrepreneurship19 with which they are used. 
(3) New Political Conditions 
 
What changed the political conditions was not directly connected to education 
per se. It was the EU’s Lisbon Agenda, decided in 2000. In this connection the European 
Council “invited” the Ministers of Education to cooperate. “Now the Commission has 
the EU institutions behind it,” related Guy Haug.20 The Bologna Process was intellectu-
ally assimilated to the Lisbon Agenda, thus: 1) putting it squarely in an area where the 
Commission had authority (vis-à-vis EU members) (Keeling 2006), and 2) connecting it to 
the main preoccupation of the member states, the amelioration of the condition of their 
economies. Seen from the vantage point of the Lisbon Agenda, research and innovation, 
and the education that contributes to them, is viewed as a deployable resource. 
 
    Ruth Keeling (2006) elaborates astutely on the “European Commission's expand-
ing role in higher education discourse,” showing how it made Bologna and Lisbon a 
“’hybrid’ Bologna/Lisbon agenda” “to firmly constitute – and reconstitute – higher 
education as a European policy domain.” But the framing changed in another way. From 
a focus on individual students (focus on the “micro” level, student mobility, student 
preparation for the labor market, “making Europeans”) the issues have been reframed 
to emphasize “society more broadly.” Education is now being dealt with primarily as 
being in the service of society (largely economy, I would add).  
 
The change was clear not only in the Commission’s being brought into the Bo-
logna process in 2001, but in its “work program” of 2002, “Education and Training 
2010,” which was adopted by the Ministers of Education. It was indicated as well by the 
efflorescence of Commission policy papers. The title of one document tells it all: “Mobi-
lising the brainpower of Europe.” A hard hitting critique, it calls for “enabling universi-
ties to make their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy,” and recommends a “core 
                                                 
19Corbett’s theme is the entrepreneurship of several key Commission figures over time. For the 
origin of the concept of political entrepreneurship, see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, 1971. 
Derek Beach (2004, 2005) argues generally that EU institutions can be thought of as “informal en-
trepreneurs,” and that they face a strategic choice of “agenda setting” or “brokering.” His major 
point is that “Governments are not fully in control even in the most intergovernmental fora…” 
(in his case, IGCs) (2005, p. 245).  
20Haug interview. 
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modernisation agenda”: “attractiveness, governance, and funding,” now revealing its 
view that universities must be differentiated, and must have “diversified” (i.e., not solely 
public) sources of funding. The Lisbon Agenda itself has not been the catalytic force that 
was hoped by its creators. But the Lisbonization of Bologna raised the priority of higher 
education policy by centering it on its role in the economy; in this way it confronted the 
“why are they horning in on a strictly national area?” argument, legitimating the involve-
ment of the Commission. 
 
V. Can Weak Organization Generate Strong Results? 
 
If one thinks of the Commission's role in the Bologna Process in organizational 
terms one can discern three phases: 
 
Phase 1: Sorbonne (1998) to Bologna (1999). Neither the EU nor the Commission 
is mentioned in either Declaration. The Commission-EUA network works for the broad 
acceptance of the Declaration of the four countries. It picks up the ball. 
Phase 2: Bologna to Prague (2001). At Bologna the Commission is marginalized. 
By Prague (or at its Tampere preparatory meeting), the Commission is invited to be a 
full participant, although given no special role. 
 
Phase 3: Prague (via Berlin 2003) and Bergen (2005) through London (2007). A 
BFUG report before the Berlin meeting argued for a change in the “steering structures”; 
there had been an extensive internal debate within BFUG on proposals for a permanent 
secretariat and/or permanent chair.21 This was not approved by the Ministers in Berlin. 
The system was (and is) that the country hosting the meeting provides the secretariat 
and the chair; that is, these rotate. Had the intention been for the Commission to be 
the Secretariat? Or had the Council of Europe, which was encouraging the extension to 
and beyond eastern European members, been in mind? Whichever it was, the question 
was raised again two years later at Bergen22 (at which the number of countries was 
raised to forty-five), and once again it was not accepted. From the standpoint of 2007, 
the Bologna intergovernmental system, now supplemented informally by Commission-
aided information and policy capabilities, seems quite stable, even with a rotating Secre-
tariat. If one thinks of phases not in terms of organizational characteristics but of politi-
cal mandate, then the Commission is now empowered by its EU mandate to “encour-
age” quality, by the Education and Training 2010 Program authorized by the Bologna 
                                                 
21“Bologna Process between Prague and Berlin,” 116 pp. See pp. 52-54. This “Zgaga report” after 
its rapporteur was commissioned by BFUG to be presented at the Berlin Ministerial meeting in 
2003.  
22Haug interview. One thinks of the “Pillar III question”: would the intergovernmental system 
put in place persist? Or, as happened in the area of EU “asylum” policy, where member states 
took such care in the Maastricht Treaty to isolate the whole domain of Justice and Home Affairs 
from the Commission and from “normal” EU policymaking, would the states find in the longer 
run that they were too hampered by the ineffectiveness of the system? 
Hix (2005, p. 370) notes that, during the time of the isolated Pillar III, the Commission strength-
ened its ability to develop policy ideas, wrote “think pieces, funded independent research and 
established internal organization,” what Hix calls a “long-term strategy.” The techniques sound 
familiar.  
  11  
Education Ministers, and also, powerfully, by the “convergence” of Bologna with the 
Lisbon agenda. 
 
Clearly, compared to the “Monnet method,” the Commission has no exclusive 
right of initiative. However, since before the Bologna Declaration, the Commission/ 
Universities (EUA) alliance has been evident in the diagnoses made, areas and proposals 
selected, kind of operationalization and review procedures, that is, persistent initia-
tives. Clearly also the Commission lacks sanctions. Guy Haug, when asked whether he 
then considered the Bologna method “a weak method,” responded: “It is a weak meth-
od,” but it is operating “in the context of great awareness”23 (which I take to mean 
awareness of common or parallel problems, of the challenging global environment, of 
authoritative comparative information, etc.). What has changed is not the subsidiarity 
constraint but the political mandate for what some analysts call the Commission's 
“leading role,”24 and I would call the leadership role of the Commission- EUA alliance. 
 
 
Processes and Drivers 
 
Despite – perhaps because of – the Treaty constraints under which it operated for 
so long, the Commission has crafted a catalytic and coordinative role. The experience of 
the Bologna Process is a clear example of the EU’s structure shaping the Commission’s 
approach even to what was never formally an EU process. And its role might be indis-
pensable to this very process. Non-hierarchical processes, to be effective, probably need 
at a minimum two elements: first, a body with “permission to herd cats,” and second, a 
real political mandate, leadership and a mandate.  
 
Processes, hard or soft, need drivers, actors who use them for some purpose. In 
the case of the Bologna Process, it seems to this writer that there was an “entrepreneurial 
alliance” between the Commission and European Universities Association. A critical aim 
for EUA was to insure that any restructuring of European Universities was founded upon 
university autonomy, and it was willing to educate its members that the price for this 
was accountability (which involved assessment). The Commission was interested in a 
greater role in formulating strategies for European education and, spurred by external 
competition, in promoting changes which would enhance European economies and 
make European higher education itself globally competitive and attractive. This alliance 
produced information, analyses, and policy proposals. It was this alliance which drove 
the Bologna Process. The “permissive consensus” among those states which had initi-
ated the process allowed the drivers to drive. Without drivers, even an explicit consen-
sus on the general nature of the problem and upon general objectives would have been 
unlikely to have induced significant results with some degree of uniformity across many 
countries (although it is certainly possible that some countries with determined govern-
ments might have been able to make their own domestic changes). 
 
There were other implicit “alliances: (1) the Commission – with many of the Min-
istries of Education which wanted reform they could not produce by themselves; (2) 
                                                 
23Haug interview. 
24Huisman and van der Wende (2004), p. 352. 
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these Ministries – with some Rectors and Rectors’ teams; (3) the Commission – and or-
ganizations representing students. My argument is that a political analysis of Bologna 
would be an analysis of all these alliances in relation to those parties that were permis-
sive, were not organized, or were left out.  
 
The Future of Bologna?  
 
The Bologna “table” has expanded from twenty-nine to forty-six states, radically 
increasingly its diversity. One veteran expert summed it up as “too many countries, too 
many observers, too many goals!”25 It remains to be seen whether the extraordinarily 
elaborate coordinating institutions and networks put in place will be able to cope with 
such an expansion.  
 
More importantly, Bologna is turning now from consensus creation among 
states to what I would call “deep implementation.” Its main focus is no longer credit 
systems and diploma supplements but “quality assurance” and “university govern-
ance,” issues which challenge traditional roles, norms and prerogatives of actors within 
universities, and even within ministries, that is, much more intrusive issues.  
Some aspects of its process might in fact be helpful. Abbott and Snidal, in a dis-
cussion of the relative advantages of soft versus hard law, note that the “participation in 
national decisions by international actors and by concerned domestic bureaucracies and 
NGOs” which characterizes many “soft law” contexts, can be “advantageous” (2000) 
(in this context, presumably to the reformers). In states where ministries closely control 
universities, this dual level approach might indeed help top university administrators 
in carrying out reforms. Recent Commission papers emphasizing the need for “leader-
ship” and “modernized governance” are clearly aimed at this. It has been suggested that 
this collaboration, both by states and across the states, may have potential for undermin-
ing the “hard mode” of the hierarchical state in this issue area, if in fact it succeeds in 
“delinking” higher education from it.26  
 
However, there has been little discussion about how to elicit cooperation within 
the University for the goals and changes articulated at the top (by the Ministries and 
Rector teams). Will such a “non-hierarchical” process still be effective if it rests primar-
ily upon hierarchy at the state and/or university level? Will it succeed if, for instance, 
its conception of “stakeholders” omits the tenured faculty, and uses terms like “staff” to 
blur this omission?  
 
VI. Conclusions   
 
This article has not been about implementation, however, but about the 
coordinative-diplomatic process which has led to such a surprising spread not only of 
goals, but of courses of action and instruments. The Bologna Process has been predomi-
nantly cooperative, but with a dual track (diplomatic/epistemic) sponsor of initiatives, a 
                                                 
25Haug interview. 
26Discussion at Osnabruck conference above. “Delinking” here refers to promoting a policy of 
universities defining their own missions and being assessed by independent third parties, not by 
the state.  
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driver which has been able to use its “hub” position not just to coordinate, but to lead. It 
has created concepts and uniform operationalizations, assembling, classifying and ana-
lyzing the comparative information it requires of the states. It has used joint “commit-
ment” and jointly agreed instruments,27 together with “support structures” which sup-
ply “templates” for reform. Its strategy of reforming and improving “European” educa-
tion implies that a “rising tide raises all ships.” 
 
Have the other governance modes been in evidence? Up to this point competition 
has been focused on universities from other regions of the globe. However, benchmark-
ing is implicitly competitive, and now the Commission is working towards a “European 
ranking” to answer the Shanghai ranking.28 Negotiation is difficult to trace in what is 
treated as a matter for expertise, but possible evidence might be seen after the fact, in (1) 
the “loosening of the 3 plus 2 model,” (2) changes now being made in ECTS to reflect not 
only time spent and level of material, but also “learning outcomes” (3) in the fact that 
the proposal for a single European “Register” of Quality Assurance Agencies, able to be 
selected by any university from any country, has been altered to permit national au-
thorities to accord recognition to those QAAs they will permit their universities to use.29 
Has hierarchy played a role? My assumption is that we would find that within states. As 
the issues become more intrusive, we may see more visible use of domestic hierarchy. 
 
Waltraud Schelke has argued that OMC is “an attempt to institutionalize a sus-
tained effort to reform…” (2004, p. 7) Even those who are cautious about the effective-
ness of OMC processes, to which Bologna bears a strong resemblance, argue that they 
help to identify and advance common interests on those issues in which all have the 
same interests and no one can be advantaged by cheating. Peter Leslie, who gave the 
more stringent formulation underlined above, named “adaptation to globalization” as a 
possible example.30 This is one way to look at the restructuring of higher education in 
Europe, and, to boot, there do not seem to be many ways to cheat or free ride, so perhaps 
the prognosis is not so bad! 
                                                 
27On the power of “instruments,” see Bruno et al. (2006). 
28The purpose of stocktaking is an analysis of “where we stand, not races between countries,” ac-
cording to the Chairman of the Stocktaking Working Group, Prof. Andrejs Rauhvargers. But note 
European Commission, “From Bergen to London,” pp. 5 and 19, and note the Commission’s sup-
port and funding for devising an “alternative” European ranking, taking account of diversities. 
29Applications for inclusion on the register should be evaluated on the basis of substantial com-
pliance with the ESG (Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance, adopted at the 2005 Min-
isterial meeting—BH) evidenced through an independent review process endorsed by national 
authorities, where this endorsement is required by those authorities” (emphasis mine) (London Com-
munique, May 18, 2007, Point 2.14. Also “Recommendation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 February 2006 on further European cooperation in quality assurance in higher 
education” (2006/147/EC).  
30Prof. Peter Leslie, comments at “Open Method of Coordination. Roundtable on Renewing 29 
Applications for inclusion on the register should be evaluated on the basis of Federal-Provincial 
Cooperation,” in “Canada: What Can Be Learned from the EU Open Method of Coordination?” 
Montreal, February 11, 2005, Institute for European Studies, McGill University—Université de 
Montréal. 
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